This article aims to examine Adam Smith’s deep and broad influence on the thought of Amartya Sen, especially concerning the issue of social justice that pervades the writings of both authors. First, we will analyze Sen’s revision of the work of Smith to refute the interpretation still prevalent, that makes use of certain excerpts from The Wealth of Nations as the main reference in defending the deregulation of markets and in exempting the economic thought from any consideration of moral values, (...) demonstrating how Sen draws on Smith’s ideas to explain the impoverishment of economics when it departs from ethics. Then, we will consider the overwhelming influence of the Smithian thought on Sen’s criticism of the theory of rational choice through his distinctive formulation of the theory of social choice, whose importance was rightly recognized, earning him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta o interesse crescente de Habermas pelo tema da religião a partir das noções de secularismo e pós-secularismo. Retomando aspectos fundamentais da teoria habermasiana da religião, destaca-se que a passagem do secularismo ao pós-secularismo descortinou novos eixos temáticos de seu pensamento, não sendo o paradigma pós-secular um contraponto ao horizonte pós-metafísico e secular da modernidade, mas à sua autocompreensão secularista. Palavras-chave: Habermas. Secularismo. Pós-secularismo.

La philosophic politique contemporaine est traversee par la question (ou le defi) du pluralisme. Parmi les theories les plus influentes, qui prennent ce probleme comme point de depart d'une reflexion normative sur la vie politique, on peut compter Celles de Habermas et de Rawls. La theorie discursive et le liberalisme politique, en effet, expriment d'une fagon similaire la question ä laquelle doit repondre toute theorie politique dans le cadre des societes modernes: comment l'existence d'une societe juste et libre est-elle possible (...) sous les conditions d'un desaccord profond et permanent entre les doctrines comprehensives ou les visions du monde qui la composent? Meme si leurs reponses au defi du pluralisme divergent ä des points importants, Habermas et Rawls partagent aussi l'idee selon laquelle la legitimite d'une conception de la justice politique depend des raisons qui peuvent etre justifiees independamment du contenu normatif propre des doctrines comprehensives ou des visions du monde. Je pense que l'idee rawlsienne de la raison publique, au moins dans sa derniere etape de developpement, permet d'envisager une nouvelle reponse ä la critique habermassienne, dans la mesure oü le consensus par recoupement n'est pas simplement une convergence heureuse qui survient par hasard, mais au contraire ne peut jouer un role approprie dans la justification politique que s'il contribue ä la stabilite sociale pour des raisons correctes. La conception politique de la justice chez Rawls partage l'idee d'une democratic deliberative organisee autour d'un ideal de justification politique dont l'aspect central est le raisonnement public des citoyens. Cette justification politique ne saurait etre interpretee comme une accommodation pure et simple des doctrines comprehensives divergentes. Elle implique l'idee d'une acceptability rationnelle fondee sur le principe liberal de legitimite. Une telle interpretation nous montre que le liberalisme politique est plus proche de la theorie discursive que ces deux penseurs, pour des raisons differentes, seraient susceptibles d'admettre. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta a posição ocupada pela teoria discursiva de Jürgen Habermas no debate entre liberalismo e multiculturalismo. Adotando uma perspectiva universalista sensível às diferenças, resultante da tese da relação interna entre democracia e estado constitucional, Habermas enfoca três aspectos interligados e diretamente vinculados à questão do reconhecimento: a idéia liberal de igualdade, os direitos de grupos e o igual tratamento das culturas. A defesa da conjugação do ideal igualitário da cidadania democrática com as demandas legítimas de indivíduos e grupos (...) se funda numa abordagem peculiar situada entre o liberalismo cego e o multiculturalismo forte. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Igualitarismo. Liberalismo. Multiculturalismo. Reconhecimento. ABSTRACT The article presents the position occupied by Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory in the debate between liberalism and multiculturalism. Adopting a difference-sensitive universalistic perspective, resulting from the thesis of the internal relation between democracy and constitutional state, Habermas focuses on three linked aspects that are directly connected with the question of recognition: the liberal idea of equality, group rights, and the equal treatment of cultures. The defense of the connection of the egalitarian ideal of democratic citizenship with the legitimate demands of individual persons and groups is based on a peculiar approach situated between blind liberalism and strong multiculturalism. KEY WORDS – Egalitarianism. Liberalism. Multiculturalism. Recognition. (shrink)

O AVANÇO DA NEUROCIÊNCIA, A QUEBRA DA DOGMÁTICA DO LIVRE-ARBÍTRIO E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES NA SEARA PENAL.

Em Uma teoria da justiça, John Rawls desenvolve os principais conceitos de sua concepção de justiça conhecida como “justiça como equidade”. Nosso foco é o aspecto distributivo desta concepção. O presente artigo procura mostrar características definidoras de uma sociedade organizada conforme as demandas de justiça dos dois princípios de justiça rawlsianos. Para tanto, exploramos os principais aspectos de uma democracia dos cidadãos-proprietários e do socialismo liberal, que são os exemplos de modelos de organização socioeconômica citados por Rawls como compatíveis com (...) sua concepção de justiça. (shrink)

Resumo: neste artigo, examinamos a ideia de que o transumanismo é uma religião. Para isso, partimos de uma definição prototípica do transumanismo, que orientará nossa abordagem. Na sequência, apresentamos a ideia de transumanismo como um tipo de religião. Além de destacar as semelhanças entre transumanismo e religião apontadas pelos defensores de tal possibilidade de associação/identificação, apresentamos algumas das suas alegações fundamentais, concluindo a seção com uma lista de diferenças entre transumanismo e religião. Em seguida, tendo em mente semelhanças e diferenças, (...) analisamos as alegações apresentadas na seção anterior, o que nos leva à contestação da plausibilidade daquela ideia. Concluímos o artigo com uma breve reconstrução da teoria habermasiana da religião, a fim de fundamentar a manutenção da separação entre as esferas da ciência e da religião, o que seria fundamental para salvaguardar o horizonte epistêmico e normativo das sociedades pós-metafísicas, democráticas e pluralistas. (shrink)

Este artigo busca desenvolver a ideia de pop’filosofia, noção presente em Deleuze, como base para uma pop’educação. Buscaremos ferramentas de leitura presentes em Deleuze, Espinosa, Nietzsche, Paulo Freire e Manoel de Barros para com elas tematizarmos as relações de ensino e aprendizado a partir do cinema.

O tema do artigo é a análise retórica do Salmo 127 no contexto dos “Salmos das Subidas”. O objetivo consiste em analisar a relação retórica possível entre o sentido da composição e o desempenho processional dos peregrinos de Jerusalém. Especificamente, trata-se de perguntar pela relação entre o conteúdo do salmo e a peregrinação para Jerusalém, a que sua leitura estaria por hipótese destinada. A metodologia consiste a) em tradução do salmo, b) análise de sua posição relativa na estrutura quiástica da (...) coleção, c) diálogo crítico com autoridades do campo dos comentários aos Salmos d) e proposição de leitura alternativa em relação ao conjunto das leituras da literatura. Concluiu-se que o Salmo 127 pode ter sido composto como alerta ou ameaça quanto ao risco de adiar-se a peregrinação a Jerusalém por força de razões que poderiam resultar na contrariedade de Yahweh, aquele que, em última análise, se não estiver contrariado, é quem garante a eficiência daquelas atividades que ora se alegariam como razões para abster-se da peregrinação. (shrink)

The theme of this article is the two narratives of the Flood of the Hebrew Bible, which, despite having been sewn into a composition, can be relatively easily separated and recovered. The purpose of the article is therefore to recover the two flood narratives of the Hebrew Bible, to demonstrate its completeness and to propose historical-social interpretation for each one of them. The text of Gn 6,5-9,17 was translated, the editorial glosses were identified, each narrative was reconstituted and considered complete (...) and ready for the hermeneutical procedure. It is concluded that, written at the end of the sixth century, the first narrative, here called “Elohist monarchical narrative of the flood”, had as its function the refoundation of the government of the golah, on his return from Babylon, while, written in the mid-fifth century, the second narrative, here called “Yahwist priestly narrative of the flood”, served to introduce the expiatory sacrifice in Jerusalem, then ruled by the priestly body. (shrink)

A partir de um recorte metodológico descritivo e de levantamento bibliográfico, na extensão que o presente instrumento de comunicação permite, o artigo apresenta um conjunto de treze teorias ou discursos sobre a religião. Mesmo quando o procedimento se revela passível de incongruência, procurou-se classificar as teorias e quase teorias em dois grupos: teorias ou quase teorias reducionistas e teorias e quase teorias não reducionistas. Foram tratadas como não reducionistas aquelas que se atêm ao conteúdo positivo da religião, sendo, por isso, (...) classificadas como substantivas. Foram tratadas como reducionistas teorias que consideram a religião a partir de e em relação a sua expressão na sociedade, sendo também classificadas de funcionalistas. Conclui-se que, em grande medida, as teorias se sobrepõem, algumas delas constituindo desdobramentos necessários ou aprofundamentos críticos de teorias anteriores, de sorte que, em rotinas de pesquisas em Ciências das Religiões se poderiam conjugar diferentes teorias e quase teorias como quadro referencial teórico-metodológico. (shrink)

Analisa-se o sentido histórico-social das expressões rûªH yhwh (“espírito de Yahweh”), rûªH-rä`â më´ët yhwh (“espírito mau desde junto de Yahweh”), rûªH-´élöhîm rä`â (“espírito mau de Deus”), rûªH-´élöhîm (“espírito de Deus”) e rûªH härä`â (“espírito mau”), de e em 1 Sm 16,14-23. Postula-se a identidade comum de todos esses personagens noológicos. Guiado por um exercício de crítica aplicada a versões da passagem, bem como pela consulta crítica por amostragem de comentários internacionais, aplica-se análise retórica e histórico-social à narrativa. Conclui-se que, no (...) horizonte de produção do texto, concebia-se essa figura celeste como o equivalente noológico de oficiais a serviço de reis, incumbidos de atividades que tanto podiam ser classificadas eticamente como boas quanto más, correspondendo tal concepção teológica ao estado da cultura judaico-israelita pré-persa. Não se trata de dois personagens: o “espírito de Yahweh” / o “espírito de Deus”, de um lado, e o “espírito mau (de Yahweh ou de Deus)” de outro, mas da descrição diferenciada da mesma figura em conformidade com a ação interpretada como realizada por ele no exercício de sua prestação de serviços ao deus-rei. Palavras-chave : 1 Sm 16,14-23. Espírito de Yahweh. Espírito de Deus. Espírito mau de Yahweh. Espírito mau de Deus. Espírito mau.The sociohistorical meaning of the expressions rûªH yhwh (“spirit of Yahweh”), rûªH-rä`â më´ët yhwh (“evil spirit from Yahweh”), rûªH-´élöhîm rä`â (“evil spirit of God”), rûªH-´élöhîm (“spirit of God”) and rûªH härä`â (“evil spirit”) of and in 1 Sm 16.14-23 is analyzed. The common identity of all these noological characters is postulated. Guided by an exercise of criticism applied to versions of the passage as well as the critical search of samples of international commentaries, rhetoric and the social-historical analysis is applied to the narrative. It is reasoned that, in the text’s production horizon, this celestial figure is conceived as the noological equivalent to officials at service of kings, responsible for activities that could be classified as both ethically good and bad, such theological conception correspond to the pre-Persian state of Jewish-Israeli culture. They are not two characters: the “spirit of Yahweh” / “spirit of God” on one side , and the “evil spirit (of Yahweh or God)” on the other, but different descriptions of the same figure in accordance to the action interpreted as carried out by him in the provision of services to the god-king . Keywords: 1 Sm 16,14-23. Spirit of Yahweh. Spirit of God. Evil spirit of Yahweh. Evil spirit of God. Evil spirit. (shrink)

Em Além do Princípio do Prazer, Freud propõe uma especulação sobre a pulsão de morte, mas percebe desde logo a dificuldade de isolá-la da pulsão de vida. A pulsão de morte possui autonomia em relação à pulsão de vida no quadro da teoria pulsional freudiana? Para responder essa questão, delimitando-a à psicanálise freudiana, propõe-se uma abordagem em quatro etapas. Em um primeiro ponto, faz-se um exercício hermenêutico baseado no texto Além do Princípio do Prazer. Logo depois, em um segundo ponto, (...) amplia-se o exercício a outros textos de Freud que abordam e exemplificam a pulsão de morte. Em um terceiro ponto, coloca-se em foco a evolução que levou Freud a afirmar a autonomia da pulsão de morte. Como Freud não oferece, mesmo em seus últimos textos, um exemplo claro da pulsão de morte isolada, apresentamos duas respostas possíveis, com base nas interpretações de Luiz Garcia-Roza e de Ignácio Paim Filho. (shrink)

Physiological responses in futsal have not been studied together with temporal information about the players’ stay on the court. The aim of this study was to compare heart rate and blood lactate concentration responses between 1-H and 2-H considering the time of permanency of the players on the court at each substitution in a futsal match. HR was recorded during entire match and [La−] was analyzed after each substitution of seven players. %HRmean and [La−] mean did not differ between 1-H (...) and 2-H. Time in intensity zones of 50–100 %HRmax differed only in 60–70 %HRmax. HR coefficient of variation throughout the match was low and among the four outfield players on the court. Substitutions, time of permanence on the court, ratio between time in- and out-ratio on the court also were similar between 1-H and 2-H. Balancing the number of substitutions, and the In:Outcourt ratio of players in both halves of the match, playing lower time at 1-H, ~8 min for each participation in the match, made it possible to maintain intensity of the match in 2-H similar to the 1H. These results are a good guidance to coaches and for application in future studies. (shrink)

New Proposals for New Questions Nuevas propuestas para nuevas cuestiones In six sections, the volume deals with different questions of political philosophy. The first section focuses on democratic theories, the second on conceptual debates, discussing topics such as collective rights, the terrorist phenomenon, Libertarianism and conceptions of freedom. In a third section on contemporary debates, perspectives on sovereignity and legitimacy as well as discourse theory versus political liberalism are discussed. The volume also features essays on democracy and law, and in (...) a section entitled oJudicial construction of democracyo papers on constitutional reviews by judges in the Netherlands as well as the construction of democracy in the context of Latin-American democracies. Finally, in the last section the volume deals with the European Constitutional Treatise, analysing the arguments and examining the legitimacy crisis and the main objections displayed against this treatise. Contents I. On Democratic theory / Teoria de la democracia: Eerik Lagerspetz: The Problem of the Common Good in Democratic Theory Sergiy Maksymov: The Kantian Project of the Law Governed Society and New Democracies II. Conceptual debates / Debates conceptuales: Martin Blanchard: Recognition and the Case of Indigenous Reparations: A Habermasian Critique of Habermas Bronik Matwijkiw: The failed Model of Terrorism Susumu Morimura: The Libertarian View of Human Nature Jonathan E. Soeharno: Freedom as Second Nature. Exploring the value of Hegel's concept of Autonomous Personality for Global institutional theory Hashimoto Tsutomu: On the Concept of Positive and Negative Liberty III. Contemporary debates / Debates contemporaneos: Terhi Kiiskinen: Sovereignty Revisited: On Inalienable Constitutional Power Luiz B. Leite Araujo: A Decade of Debate: Discourse Theory versus Political Liberalism IV. Democracy and law / Democracia y derecho: Kenneth E. Himma: Does it really mather whether a Judicial Decision is morally Legitimate? The practical implications of Judicial Illegitimacy in a otherwise Legitimate State Carl Lebeck: Commitments, Rules and the limits of Constitutionalism Oliver W. Lembcke: Exception Rules? Freedom and the Order in a State of Exception Bart van Klink: Does Necessity knows no Laws? Application of Law in a State of Exception Costanza Margiotta: Ideas and Values of the oLegalo State Jiri Priban: Constitution-Making. Morality and Legal Symbolism: on Identity, Temporality and Differentiation of the legal, political and moral Systems V. Judicial construction of democracy / Construccion judicial de la democracia: Maurice Adams: Judging the Constitution: the Third Way. Some reflections on the introduction of Constitutional Review by Judges in The Netherlands Larry Alexander: What is the Problem of Judicial Review? Roberto Corona Copado: Las reglas del juego democratico. La Suprema Corte de Justicia de Mexico en la solucion de controversias entre organos del poder politico desde 1995 Jose de J. Ibarra Cardenas: La construccion judicial de la Democracia en Iberoamerica VI. Deliberation on European constitutional norm / Deliberacion sobre la nueva constitucion europea: Olaf Tans: Deliberating European Constitucional Norms. An Analysis of arguments Carla M. Zoethout: The Court and the Charter or Who Guards the Court of Justice of the EU under the new Constitution?. (shrink)

This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

I take as my starting point the evident fact that people are capable of modifying their beliefs in response to reasons in the course of deliberation. This fact is sufficient to make notions such as responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness applicable to people with regard to their beliefs. If a state is such, and one is such, that one is capable of determining it through one’s best evaluations of reasons in the course of deliberation, then even if it isn’t under one’s (...) voluntary control, it is attributable to one as something for which one is appropriately held accountable. There is thus conceptual space for the possibility of one’s conducting oneself poorly or well with regard to it, and accordingly for the application of praise or criticism. And there is room for an evaluation of whether one has conducted oneself responsibly or irresponsibly – that is, whether one has proceeded in a way that takes proper account of the considerations which one reasonably could have been expected to take account of, or not. (shrink)

Este artigo problematiza, sob o ponto de vista teórico da Análise do Discurso francesa, por que, em algumas regiões do Nordeste brasileiro, há quem evite pronunciar a palavra macaco e opte por usar em seu lugar outras palavras, tais como dezessete. A hipótese defendida é a de que essa prática cultural-discursiva, entendida aqui como uma forma de interdição, ocorre basicamente em regiões sertanejas onde a memória do cangaço é ainda marcadamente diluída no cotidiano. A partir da análise de discursos presentes (...) no dia a dia, este artigo pretende contribuir para uma compreensão mais acurada de uma particularidade sociocultural brasileira. (shrink)

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called "Inferential Internalist" principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...) that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...) could entirely miss the relevance of this evidence and hold the belief as a result of wishful thinking or for some other bad reason. My topic in this paper is the notion of being justified which precludes beliefs flawed in this way. I will take the notion of something’s telling in favor of the truth of a proposition—that is, the notion of evidential support—for granted. (shrink)

Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.

A catarse é considerada por muitos autores como um “efeito” ligado a um processo que leva à tomada de consciência. Que “efeito” é esse? Por quem foi sistematizado? Quais abordagens foram construídas a partir desse conceito? Qual a sua relação com a educação e com os espaços escolar e expositivo? O artigo em tela pretende refletir, por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica, sobre essas questões ao revisitar o conceito de catarse a partir de autores como Aristóteles, Vigotski, Jauss e, em especial, (...) Lukács. Busca relacionar as ideias desse esteta húngaro ao campo da educação e, principalmente, ao ensino da arte. (shrink)

Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...) contention that the seeds of such arguments lie in our ordinary epistemic practices, so that external world skepticism can arise “from within”. But is this contention correct? I doubt it. Taking skepticism seriously requires that we address this question head on. To do so, I will approach skeptical arguments from a certain vantage point. I will try to stand, as far as possible, with both feet squarely in ordinary life. I will start out with all of our ordinary commitments about what is the case, about what we know or have reason to believe, about when someone knows, is justified, or has good reason to believe something, and about how one should proceed in deciding what to believe. My question, then, will be this. From within that vantage point can I somehow be moved in a reasonable way to accept the conclusion that I know far less about the world around me than I thought, or that epistemically speaking, I really ought not believe much of what I have believed about the world around me? In order for such movement to take place, I will have to find reason from within my ordinary standpoint to discount or reject much of what I ordinarily accept. And of course, that reason will have to come from some.. (shrink)

Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...) the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...) a defense of them that starts from nowhere. She likewise rejects the more limited demand for a defense that makes use only of considerations that do not concern the world outside of her mind. She allows that some considerations about the world can be appealed to perfectly appropriately as fully adequate evidence in favor of other considerations about the world. So why can’t the Plain Inquirer rule out global skeptical hypotheses by producing evidence against them that depends upon other considerations about the world? Is there good reason for singling out global skeptical hypotheses such as _I am not being deceived by an evil demon_ as requiring a different kind of treatment? Considerations about epistemic asymmetry and epistemic circularity, as well as Wittgensteinian considerations about the relation between evidence and the real-world and human background context, all lead to the conclusion that there is not. (shrink)

This book argues that external world skepticism is false for straightforward reasons. To make this case it develops and defends a neglected methodological approach involving a distinctive process of first-person reflection. We begin within the practices, procedures, and commitments of ordinary life and science. We then seek some reason to think skepticism true, carefully scrutinizing all the most important arguments. Finding no reason to think it true and decisive reasons to think it false, we reject it. As the book shows, (...) this is a fully satisfactory refutation. No epistemological theorizing is needed. The book begins by exploring and defending this method in seminal works of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. Turning to contemporary epistemology, it asks why we shouldn't appeal to considerations about the world when responding to skeptical argumentation. No good reason is found, despite exploration of a wide range of central issues in recent epistemology. To the contrary, perfectly ordinary examples indicate that it is correct to reject the skeptical scenarios - the dreaming worry, Descartes' evil demon, the brain-in-a-vat - by appealing to things we know about the world. Likewise, considerations about sensory perception do not provide any reason to think our evidence excludes considerations about the world. Along the way, methodological lessons are drawn from consideration of the most important skeptical arguments in the contemporary literature. The book concludes by defending the satisfactoriness of its approach. What emerges is a new understanding of what philosophical illumination might look like in relation to core epistemological issues. (shrink)

“Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...) warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...) extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters. (shrink)

Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...) requires the ability to self-consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well-supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self-conscious process of changing one's mind. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 175-194.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...) current inquiry and action. Fallibilism, so construed, was given its most influential formulation – and its name – by C. S. Peirce, though it was advocated by earlier philosophers as well, particularly the later ancient skeptic Philo of Larissa and perhaps also Hume. Contemporary epistemologists almost universally agree in endorsing this intellectual stance; it is part of the undisputed framework within which contemporary epistemological theorizing takes place. (shrink)

: Michael Gazzaniga, a prominent cognitive neuroscientist, has argued against reductionist accounts of cognition. Instead, Gazzaniga defends a form of non-reductive physicalism: epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism and ontological monist physicalism. His position is motivated by the theses that: cognitive phenomena can be realized by multiple neural systems; many outcomes of these systems are unpredictable; and multi-level explanations are required. Epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism is presented as the most appropriate stance to account for the way in which phenomena should be explained in cognitive (...) neuroscience. In this paper, I argue, however, that a recent form of neuro-cognitive reductionism, namely neo-mechanistic reductionism accounts for the arguments presented by Gazzaniga. Thus, the theory offers a more consistent and well-articulated view of the relationship between cognitive and neural phenomena that is specifically compatible with the explanatory strategies and aims of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. Keywords: Neo-mechanistic Philosophy; Michael Gazzaniga; Non-reductionism; Reductionism; Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience L’antiriduzionismo neurocognitivo di Michael Gazzaniga e la sfida della riduzione neomeccanicista Riassunto: Uno dei più importanti neuroscienziati dei nostri tempi, Michael Gazzaniga, si è schierato contro una concezione riduzionista della cognizione. Al contrario Gazzaniga difende una forma di fisicalismo non-riduzionistico che risulta dalla combinazione, sul piano epistemologico, di un anti-riduzionismo cognitivo e, sul piano ontologico, di un monismo fisicalista. La sua posizione è motivata dalla tesi per cui i fenomeni cognitivi possono essere realizzati da molteplici sistemi neurali; molti esiti di tali sistemi non si possono prevedere; e sono pertanto necessarie spiegazioni a livelli plurimi. La concezione presentata come più adeguata per dare conto sul piano epistemologico di come i fenomeni dovrebbero essere spiegati all’interno delle neuroscienze cognitive è una forma di anti-riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo. In questo articolo si sostiene tuttavia che una recente forma di riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo può dare conto degli argomenti presentati da Gazzaniga. Si tratta di una teoria che offre una interpretazione maggiormente coerente ed articolata della relazione fra fenomeni cognitivi e neurali e che offre un modello di spiegazione compatibile con gli scopi esplicativi delle neuroscienze cognitive contemporanee. Parole chiave: Filosofia neomeccanicista; Michael Gazzaniga; Nonriduzionismo; Riduzionismo; Filosofia della neuroscienza cognitiva. (shrink)

RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é examinar o que entendemos ser uma prova original da existência de Deus na obra de Pierre Duhem. Cremos que a originalidade dessa prova consiste especialmente nas premissas usadas pelo filósofo. Quanto à forma, a mesma assemelha-se ao conhecido argumento do desígnio, mas a sua versão se caracteriza por buscar na história das teorias físicas a matéria da qual a existência de uma Providência é derivada. É a complexa evolução das teorias e, a despeito dela, (...) a sua espantosa progressividade em direção a estágios sempre mais perfeitos que servem de premissa para a via duhemiana de acesso a Deus. Tudo se passa como se houvesse uma suposta pré-ordenação divina do curso das teorias, uma finalidade intrínseca a ele.ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to examine what we believe to be an original proof of the existence of God in the work of Pierre Duhem. We think that the originality of this proof consists especially in the assumptions used by the French philosopher in his argumentation. Regarding the form, it resembles the well-known design argument, but his version is characterized by seeking in the history of physical theories the matter from which the existence of a Providence is derived. It is the complex evolution of theories and, despite it, its amazing progress towards ever more perfect theories that serves as the premise for Duhem's way of access to God. Everything goes as if it had been a divine preordainment and an intrinsic goal ruling the evolution of theories. (shrink)

A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...) a person's standing with regard to the reasons that there are for and against the truth of a belief. Thus the objection from our ordinary practices is sound: fallibility is not an epistemological shortcoming, and a convincing sceptical argument must use only requirements which figure in ordinary epistemic practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully (...) consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism, an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.RESUMO No debate atual entre realismo científico e empirismo, ambos os lados parecem abraçar algum tipo de estruturalismo como um componente importante de suas descrições sobre a ciência. O realismo estrutural é geralmente apresentado em duas versões: uma ôntica e outra epistêmica. Tem-se argumentado que o realismo estrutural epistêmico, por sua vez, é próximo, se não idêntico, a uma abordagem kantiana. Nosso objetivo neste artigo é mostrar que esse não é o caso. Sendo o ESR fundamentalmente uma posição realista, queremos defender que ele não pode ser totalmente compatível com uma abordagem transcendental. Uma posição kantiana mais coerente é aqui defendida sob o nome de estruturalismo transcendental. Neste artigo, partiremos da interpretação de Henry Allison do idealismo transcendental para estabelecer as devidas distinções entre ESR e TS. (shrink)

Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...) contention that the seeds of such arguments lie in our ordinary epistemic practices, so that external world skepticism can arise “from within”. But is this contention correct? I doubt it. Taking skepticism seriously requires that we address this question head on. To do so, I will approach skeptical arguments from a certain vantage point. I will try to stand, as far as possible, with both feet squarely in ordinary life. I will start out with all of our ordinary commitments about what is the case, about what we know or have reason to believe, about when someone knows, is justified, or has good reason to believe something, and about how one should proceed in deciding what to believe. My question, then, will be this. From within that vantage point can I somehow be moved in a reasonable way to accept the conclusion that I know far less about the world around me than I thought, or that epistemically speaking, I really ought not believe much of what I have believed about the world around me? In order for such movement to take place, I will have to find reason from within my ordinary standpoint to discount or reject much of what I ordinarily accept. And of course, that reason will have to come from some.. (shrink)

O experimento de pensamento das Terras Gêmeas é usado como um dos fortes argumentos a favor da tese de que significados não estão na cabeça, cérebro ou mente. Neste artigo este argumento será considerado, e será criticado a partir de uma análise de exemplos nos quais a referência de um termo no mundo não possui essência fixa e as definições são imprecisas. Em contraste, será argumentado que o significado está ligado a representações internas prototípicas individuais.